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Abstract: Landscape is increasingly conceptualized as a resource. We argue that 
although a resource-based approach may be positive in terms of conservation out-
comes, focusing on use value does not do sufficient justice to the many complex 
facets of landscape. Reiterating the Florence Declaration on Landscape, which 
considers that “landscape is a common good”, we suggest that the conceptualiza-
tion of landscape as a commons will resolve the discrepancy. However, a concep-
tual shift towards a more holistic commons-based approach requires a detailed 
understanding of the different values of landscape. Based on a phenomenological 
conceptualization of the landscape, this article explores the theoretical roots of 
the definition of the different values of landscape. It distinguishes between use, 
existence (e.g. aesthetic) and intrinsic values. This exercise is not an end in itself, 
but is intended to establish a theoretical framework promoting a dialogue between 
these values and show how they complement each other. A precise understanding 
of the different landscape values contributes not only to the conceptualization of 
landscape as a commons, but also to a better understanding of real-life landscape 
conflicts. Drawing on the empirical example of the Lavaux UNESCO World 
Heritage Site in Switzerland, the article demonstrates that, in practice, landscape 
conservation projects that avoid deadlock succeed in striking a balance between 
the three conceptions of landscape value.
Keywords: Conflicts, existence value, intrinsic value, landscape commons, phe-
nomenology, use value
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1. Introduction
Landscape is increasingly conceptualized as a resource.1 This approach gained 
international recognition when it was adopted by the European Landscape 
Convention (Council of Europe 2000), which asserts that landscape “constitutes a 
resource favourable to economic activity and whose protection, management and 
planning can contribute to job creation”. This move towards a resource-based con-
ception of landscape is widely presented as a necessary stage in the consideration 
of its sustainable management. In this article, we argue that although the resource-
based approach may be positive in terms of conservation outcomes, focusing on 
use value does not do sufficient justice to the many complex facets of landscape 
and – more pragmatically – to the resolution of landscape conflicts. In other 
words, landscape has other values that the resource-based approach cannot prop-
erly apprehend. Reiterating the Florence Declaration on Landscape (UNESCO 
2012), which considers that “landscape is a common good”, we suggest that the 
conceptualization of landscape as a commons2 will resolve the discrepancy. This 
conceptual shift from a resource-based to a commons-based approach requires a 
detailed understanding of the different values of landscape and their relationships 
with each another.
The value of landscape is difficult to apprehend theoretically; as a result, 
disparate lists of values are often produced inductively. “Preservation and 
conservation work often unfolds amid unstated or undertheorized assump-
tions about the importance of conserving things” (Bluestone 2000, 65). Many 
methods have been proposed for appraising the value of landscape (Hayden 
1995). Formalized landscape assessments generally rely on predetermined cri-
teria (aesthetic, historic, scientific, etc.) to appraise landscapes. Typically, this 
procedure is followed by landscape assessments as defined in national laws 
or policies (Stephenson 2008). Such approaches may lead to an impoverished 
understanding if they rely on the assumption that values always accord with 
predetermined typologies (Dakin 2003, 190). Alternatively, landscape value 
definitions can also be derived from public participation processes (Brown and 
Brabyn 2012).
The different use values of landscape are commonly used to characterize 
landscapes (Stephenson 2008). Aesthetic, symbolic or identity values are also 
1
 For instance, the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment is actively promoting a shift “from 
environmental policies to resource policies” (Ott and Staub 2009).
2
 Although “the common good” can also refer to the idea of the general interest (Sgard 2010), this is 
not the meaning conveyed by the Florence Declaration on Landscape, which refers to landscape as 
“a common good”, i.e. as a commons. To avoid possible confusion, we use the term “commons” in 
this article (except in citations).
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the focus of many landscape assessments (Junge et al. 2015; Klein et al. 2015). 
Intrinsic value is not addressed in most cases; it tends to be associated with tradi-
tional conservation philosophies or intellectual elites (Serageldin 2000). However 
we will stress its importance in the analysis of landscape-related conflicts as well. 
The concept of the commons plays a central role in this respect.
Commons is a polysemous concept (Harribey 2011). In the narrower sense of 
the word, commons – understood as common pool resources3 – refers to “a natural 
or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not 
impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits to its use” 
(Ostrom 1990, 30). Once extracted, resource units are not available to other users 
anymore (subtractability) (McGinnis 2011). In a broader historical context, com-
mons are managed by collective institutions which constitute the opposite of enclo-
sures (Polanyi 1944). They represent a bulwark against private appropriation that 
paves the way for commodification and marketization. Consequently, commons 
symbolize the collective, the inalienable and the irreplaceable (Bollier and Helfrich 
2013). This is why they are “so socially and politically contested” (Olwig 2003).
In view of the growing importance of the resource-based approach to evaluat-
ing landscapes and the conceptual difficulties that often arise when non-use values 
are associated with a resource-based appraisal, this article aims to go back to the 
theoretical roots of the definition of the different values of landscape. This exer-
cise is not an end in itself, but is intended to establish a theoretical framework that 
promotes a dialogue between these values and shows how they complement each 
other. The article also aims to demonstrate how a precise understanding of the 
different landscape values can contribute to the conceptualization of landscape 
as a commons, and how such a concept can be used empirically to reach a better 
understanding of landscape conflicts. In particular, we argue that a negotiated bal-
ance needs to be found between the preservation of the resource-based value of 
the landscape (use value) and other non-utility values that may be attributed to it.
Our considerations are divided into five main sections. Following a brief pre-
sentation of the definitions of the landscape used in the article, we discuss both the 
advantages and limits of a resource-based conception of the landscape (Section 
2). We then do the same for a non-utility conception of the landscape (Section 3) 
and arrive at a proposal for greater landscape sustainability based on the linking 
of these two approaches (Section 4). We then illustrate this proposal based on 
the case of the Lavaux UNESCO World Heritage Site (Section 5). We conclude 
with a discussion on the merit of appraising landscapes as commons rather than 
resources (Section 6).
3
 One of the major contributions of Ostrom and her school has been to demonstrate the importance of 
distinguishing commons from the institutions that govern them – the common-pool resource institu-
tions (CPRI). Based on this, it was possible to demonstrate that CPRI are not worse than private or 
public property per se when it comes to the management of the environment, thereby rehabilitating 
a type of institution that was often considered a relic of the past by modern scholars (Ostrom et al. 
2002).
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2. The resource-based approach to landscape
2.1. Definition of landscape
Numerous approaches to landscape exist, not only in geography but also in other 
disciplines (Jones 1991; Stephenson 2008). The adoption of a holistic approach 
to landscape is often hindered by the incompatibility of landscape-related theory 
and methodology (Tress and Tress 2001). In this article we basically differenti-
ate between four conceptions of the cultural landscape, which we refer to in the 
rationale presented below.
According to the culturalist approach associated with the visual arts and repre-
sentation, the landscape corresponds to the recognition by the spectator of elements 
observed in nature and the matching of these elements with ‘schemata’ that result 
from a process of intellectual permeation by the representations produced by all 
creative activities, but painting and photography in particular (Roger 1997). This 
conception of the landscape is perfectly illustrated in the characteristic ‘visual cul-
ture’ of the English eighteenth century (Williams 1989; Matless 1993, 1996). From 
the perspective of the proponents of the culturalist approach, landscape is appraised 
mainly visually with the help of culturally-constituted lenses. It is not possible to 
truly see, it is only possible to see ‘as’: the landscape is admired through frame views 
similar to paintings. In the context of the culturalist definition of the landscape, the 
latter is a cultural fact which is solely the concern of the human subject who experi-
ences it. Hence the apprehension of the landscape depends above all on mechanisms 
for the recognition of previously internalized schemata (Reichler 2002).
Contemporary thinking on landscape calls for a move beyond static under-
standings and for the inclusion of movement, social practice, and time. We refer 
below to these approaches as historical and cultural geography approaches. 
According to the European Landscape Convention (Council of Europe 2000), 
“‘Landscape’ means an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result 
of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors” (our italics). The 
perception of landscapes and the use made of them varies over time, depending 
on the individuals and groups involved (Antrop 2005). Accordingly, the assess-
ment of the ‘beauty’ or the ‘ugliness’ of a landscape varies (Beza 2010). “At the 
time when the code of classical beauty was almost universally dominant, […] the 
sea was ugly, the mountains were ugly, forests were ugly, the desert was ugly, 
vastness was ugly, unlimited and unframed expanses were ugly. From the time 
when the codes became intertwined, things became complicated” (Corbin 2001, 
94). As with the culturalist approach, Cosgrove (2001) focuses on the view of the 
landscape, albeit with the aim of demonstrating the power relations and ideology 
that shape the landscape. The idea of power is also at the heart of the Marxist 
analysis of the landscape: while human labour and relations of domination shape 
the landscape over the centuries, other interests try to erase these traces by focus-
ing exclusively on the scenic value of the landscape (Mitchell 2003).
Cultural geographers also focus on landscape’s subjective and experiential 
aspects (e.g. Meinig 1979; Tuan 1979; Jackson 1989); the landscape can also be 
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understood from the perspective of phenomenology, which is inspired by the phi-
losophy of Husserl (1982), Heidegger (1996) and Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1964). 
Contrary to the culturalist approach, for which landscape is primarily reduced to 
a phenomenon of visual recognition, phenomenology insists more on the sensory 
experience (Straus 1963, 1966) or on the physical experience (Sauer 1965). This 
link between man and nature is constantly renewed and unique on every occasion. 
Furthermore, the phenomenological approach of environmental aesthetics also 
stresses that, like all relationships with the environment, the relationship with the 
landscape involves a “somatic engagement” (Berleant 1992, 166), which activates 
all of the senses and not only visual perception. This extension is also based on 
the ecological approach to perception formulated by James Gibson (1979) using 
the concept of affordance. The latter is used by several authors today (for example 
Heft 2010; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Menatti and Casado da Rocha 2016) 
to express the cultural and social dimension of the landscape with its ecological 
basis. Hence it enables the reconciliation of the cultural and phenomenological 
approaches to landscape conceived as a processual reality.
The theory of landscape developed by the French geographer and landscape 
specialist Augustin Berque (1990, 2000, 2013) attempts to integrate the different 
approaches explained above. According to Berque, the “milieu” is the space that 
surrounds a society, in which this society acts, and whose biological, political 
etc. affect the society in turn. The milieu is “the relationship that links a society 
with space and with nature”; as such “this relationship is both physical and phe-
nomenal” (Berque 2000, 48). The milieu is just as much shaped by the activi-
ties of humans as it shapes human behaviour itself (Antrop 2005); it materializes 
the relationship between a society and space and nature. Based on this, Berque 
defines the environment and landscape as the two constituent dimensions of the 
milieu. The environment corresponds to the physical and factual dimension of the 
milieu while the landscape refers to the interpretation made of this physical and 
factual dimension. Given that it is never possible at any time to definitively sepa-
rate these two dimensions from each other, the landscape is – in other words – the 
phenomenological, sensory and symbolic dimension of the milieu.
2.2. The significance of the resource-based approach
The utility approach to the landscape is based on the conception of landscape 
as a resource.4
 The understanding of the landscape as a resource is justified by 
pragmatic considerations, according to which the landscape is subject to differ-
ent kinds of over-exploitation which pose a threat to its continuing existence and, 
therefore, its sustainability.
4
 According to a constructivist and relational perspective, “resources are not automatically viewed 
as factors with an inherent use-value and predetermined application. […] The use-value of a resource 
depends upon the social context within which goals and capabilities are shaped” (Bathelt and Glück-
ler 2005, 1547).
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The resource concept focuses on the resource ‘users’ (Hunziker et al. 2008) 
and indirectly channels the attention to all of the actors who gravitate around the 
users, irrespective of whether they exploit, destroy, protect, provide access to, reg-
ulate etc. the resource (Gerber and Knoepfel 2008). Each actor acts on the basis 
of the leeway granted to him or her by the rules (institutions) and values (norms) 
of the society in which he or she lives (Vatn 2009). The resource-based approach 
prompts the analyst to ask about these rules and values when the condition of the 
resource is under threat, thereby opening the door to the consideration of legal and 
institutional means leading to its conservation (Herlin 2004).
If the landscape is the sensory and symbolic manifestation of the milieu, it cre-
ates a relationship of meaning, which is constantly being renegotiated, between 
communities and their physical and biological environment (Berque 2013). The 
existence of the landscape involves two partners – the human communities and 
nature – and the preservation of this link relies on both. In theory it is possible to 
identify two diametrically opposed scenarios in relation to the preservation of this 
relationship. One can either act on the human subject so as to ensure that, through 
a process of awareness-raising, his or her expectations correspond to the reality 
of the constantly changing landscape, or one can shape the landscape so that it 
corresponds to the subject’s expectations. In terms of regulation, the former case 
would be characterized by ‘letting-go’ (laisser-aller). This position, which is fre-
quently inspired by post-modern considerations, starts from the perspective that it 
is artificial to want to stop the evolution of the landscape – an attitude considered 
as ‘conservative’ – and that people should be allowed to build constantly updated 
links of meaning with their environment. “We do not yet know how to see our 
industrial complexes, our futurist cities, the landscape power of a motorway. […] 
Every face of nature has the enduring possibility of being seen as poetic” (Roger 
1997, 113–114).
The opposite point of view advocates a consumer approach to the landscape 
(based on the pleasure provided by a landscape) and can be deployed sometimes 
in the context of natural parks. With the “acceleration in time” that accompa-
nied the industrial revolution and the increasingly rapid development of our ways 
of life, the everyday and banal object becomes exotic in less than a generation 
(Donadieu 1994). Conservation and placing under protection involves putting 
something apart with a view to attempting to exclude it from the real and sym-
bolic effects of time (Pearce 2000).
2.3. The limits of the resource-based approach
Neither of the two extremes of non-intervention in the landscape nor its abso-
lute protection satisfy the criterion of sustainability. In the first case, human 
beings are very likely to become distanced from a milieu that is changing 
too quickly, and their relationship of meaning with the milieu will suffer as a 
result. In the second case, we cannot speak of conserving the landscape when 
the placing of areas under protection with a view to conserving them springs 
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from the inability to recognize the process involving the constant updating 
of how users interpret their experience of the landscape. The associated risks 
of museumization, idealization of the past and ‘Disneyfication’ ensue (Augé 
1997; Sgard 2010; Nelson 2013). What is involved here is a representation that 
no longer responds to a criterion of ‘authenticity’ in the sense that it involves a 
caricature of the landscape.
In reality, these two situations are rooted in the same conceptual confusion 
because, as already noted, the resource-based approach is centred on the ‘user’ of 
the landscape. By placing the emphasis on the use of the landscape as a cultural 
resource and, accordingly, the repository of meaning it constitutes, the actor-user 
risks obliterating the fact that the relationship with the landscape constitutes first 
and foremost the experience of an environment. And it is this experience that is 
constantly updated by a human subject which makes the milieu a singular land-
scape. The latter becomes unclassifiable, so to speak, because it is fundamentally 
unique. The resource-based approach tends, therefore, to disregard the unique 
character that the landscape has by definition as an object of an experience. The 
actor-users are mindful of aspects of one landscape that may also be presented by 
another. The landscape as a resource is particular in the sense that it shares com-
mon characteristics with other landscapes. When a singular landscape is replaced 
by a particular landscape, one of the two above-described situations results: (1) 
we see either the adoption of a ‘laisser-aller’ approach to the landscape, which 
fails to see it as a truly singular object because the rapidity of the change of milieu 
prevents the users of truly experiencing it: or (2) we observe a process of rigidi-
fication of the living landscape and its fixation in a representation which has the 
fatal result of its museumization or Disneyfication. Both of these situations are at 
odds with landscape conservation.
3. The non-utility approach to the landscape
We will now demonstrate the contribution of the conceptual distinction between 
the particular landscape and singular landscape to the debate surrounding land-
scape conservation.
The non-utility approach to the landscape refers to a highly diversified 
research field, whose origins go back to the 18th century in Europe at least and 
which has been developed in recent decades in British and American philosophy, 
in particular in connection with the environment.5
3.1. The significance of the non-utility approach
The non-utility conception of the relationship with the landscape makes it possi-
ble to provide conceptual clarification of certain stumbling blocks associated with 
the aforementioned resource-based approach. As we have seen, the latter priori-
5
 For a general overview of the leading theorists of the field, see Carlson and Lintott (2007) and 
Carlson and Berleant (2004).
From landscape resources to landscape commons 715
tizes the perspective of the human subject, that is the point of view of the users of 
the landscape. It could be said that, in contrast to this, the non-utility approach to 
the landscape focuses more on the landscape as an object. When it is a question of 
consuming the landscape for the pleasure it provides – which is precisely one of 
the variants of the resource-based approach – what presents a value in itself is the 
human experience of the landscape. And the latter is only a means of experiencing 
pleasure. Its visual representation, for example, or another landscape that is more 
or less similar could provide as much pleasure in principle. In other words, within 
the resource-based approach, the landscape is the object of an experience that can 
easily be substituted by another which is likely to produce the same effect.
The non-utility approach goes further. In order to understand it, we need only 
refer to modern aesthetics – for instance the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant. This 
considers the pleasure felt through the experience of the landscape as being essen-
tially aesthetic in nature, i.e. it is disinterested in the sense that the object of the 
(aesthetic) pleasure is no longer a means to an end (pleasure) but an end in itself. 
Furthermore, this finality of the aesthetic object is perceived without us represent-
ing its purpose to ourselves. These are the two characteristics that Kant identified 
in all natural features that we evaluate as beautiful (Kant [1790] 1987).
Seen from this perspective, the landscape is no longer simply a resource, and 
the value we attribute to it is not solely a use-related value intended to satisfy our 
interests. The aesthetic relationship with the landscape leads to its valuation in its 
own existence as a singular object that cannot be substituted, irrespective of the 
fact that we are incapable of justifying our judgement of it. Thus we have moved 
on from the use value of the landscape to what we call its ‘existence value’, a 
relational value which is closely associated with a first-hand experience of the 
landscape – an aesthetic one in this instance (other existence values exist – affec-
tive, symbolic, patrimonial, identity etc. – that are derived from the singular expe-
rience of a landscape). This is an existence value in that the (intrinsic) value of the 
experience is closely linked with the existence of the landscape in question (Hess 
2013, 61–84). If the landscape were different or were to change suddenly, the 
quality of the experience would no longer be the same either; it would no longer 
be the experience of this landscape but the experience of a different one.
However, if the singular landscape is indissociable from an experience, the 
judgement relating to it can be conceived as purely reflective or determining. Kant 
([1790] 1987) was of the view that aesthetic judgement can only be reflective; it 
does not qualify the object of the experience but the state of the human subject 
in relation to this object. As we shall see below, an entire school of thought was 
initiated and developed by the philosopher Allen Carlson (2000), who sought to 
demonstrate that the aesthetic appreciation of the environment qualified the object 
of the experience – hence, to use Kant’s terminology, the judgement is also deter-
mining. The judgement is determining in that it qualifies the object of the experi-
ence. The state of the subject of the experience was henceforth informed by the 
knowledge of naturalists, ecologists, geologists, experts in natural history etc. in 
relation to the object. For example, it is legitimate to believe that a person con-
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fronted with an over one-thousand-year-old sequoia will have a different – more 
suitable or appropriate – aesthetic experience when informed of the age of the 
tree. In this case, the aesthetic judgment qualifies the object itself.
When applied to the landscape, this approach makes it possible to avoid the 
stumbling blocks associated with the resource-based approach in that it seeks to 
identify a category of value – the existence value – of a landscape that is con-
ceptually distinct from use value. However, difficulties arise when the practical 
consequences are drawn from the two versions in which this approach presents.
3.2. The limits of the non-utility approach
By highlighting the subjective relationship between each individual and the land-
scape, the non-utility approach faces a new difficulty. This consists in collectively 
defining recognized landscape conservation objectives. This section opens up ave-
nues for going beyond the contradictions between a subjectivist interpretation of the 
relationship with the landscape and the social imperatives of landscape conservation.
Within the subjectivist paradigm, concrete landscape conservation projects 
inevitably collide with the limits of the debate on aesthetic quality, on which its 
conservation is likely to be based. This kind of quality is always subjective, not 
only in the sense that it involves an individual experience but above all in the 
sense that there is no objective reason for this experience to be imposed on the 
others: according to the non-utility approach of a subjectivist order, every aes-
thetic evaluation of the landscape has its legitimacy.
Continuing the Kantian tradition, for example, the German philosopher 
Martin Seel maintains that, as Kant also believed, without being entirely private, 
aesthetic evaluation does not qualify the object but the subjective perception of 
this object. Of course, the latter acknowledged that every aesthetic assessment 
claims to be universally valid but remains nonetheless subjective. As Seel (1996, 
285–286) points out: “the judgement in relation to an aesthetics of nature […] is 
an intersubjective judgement without an objective component”. This aspect dif-
fers from the judgement of a work of art as, in this case, the appreciation claims to 
have a form of objectivity; there is an objective component that may be justified 
by the debates of the art critics and historians. According to Seel, this form of 
intersubjectivity for objective purposes does not exist in relation to the aesthetics 
of the landscape.
Based on this subjectivity of the appreciation, it is unlikely, therefore, that an 
aesthetic judgement of a landscape will be shared by others. When seeking a ratio-
nal basis for ensuring landscape sustainability within the non-utility approach, we 
encounter the individual views of different people, all of which are also autho-
rized. It follows that within the framework of this subjectivist interpretation of 
the non-utility approach, practically intractable conflicts will be identified in the 
debates surrounding the conservation of and damage to the landscape.
Nonetheless, it is possible to avoid such a consequence by adopting the objec-
tivist perspective of the non-utility approach as described earlier. This involves 
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the belief that there is, in fact, an objective component to the aesthetic apprecia-
tion of nature. To do this, as proposed by Carlson’s cognitivist aesthetics, it is 
possible to refer to the scientific knowledge provided by geology or ecology, for 
example. As confirmed also by the above-presented culturalist approach to the 
landscape, the aesthetic judgement of a landscape would then be similar to that 
of a work of art: it could claim to be relevant precisely because it is based on an 
objective fact. Although it can claim to describe the object of the experience in 
this instance, it can encounter another stumbling block, however.
What happens on the conceptual level when the aesthetic appreciation of the 
landscape is informed by scientific knowledge, in other words, when a landscape 
may be described objectively as beautiful? In this case – to remain within the per-
spective of modern aesthetics advocated by Kant –, the pleasure provided by the 
object of experience is disinterested, that is to say the object of the pleasure is an 
end in itself. However, in addition, it is also an end through itself, so to speak, in 
the sense that the scientific (geological, ecological, naturalist etc.) knowledge (to 
which the historical, sociological psychological etc. knowledge could be added) 
that enables its characterization forms the basis of its aesthetic appreciation. This 
is precisely the point of view defended by Carlson’s aesthetics. To say of a land-
scape that it is an end in and through itself tends to objectivize it as though it 
possessed the characteristics of its objective aesthetic appreciation within itself. 
Hence, the landscape no longer only assumes an – always subjective – existence 
value based on the fact that the judgement that it expresses is reflective: its value 
is, from now on, intrinsic or epistemically objective (Hess 2013, 61–84) because 
the aesthetic judgement in relation to it is determining, that is it is justified by the 
scientific knowledge of the object.
To be clear, the expression “intrinsic value” refers here to the objectivity of 
aesthetic value at the epistemic level, in the sense that this value is no longer depen-
dent on the individual interests, mood or feelings of the subject. Nevertheless this 
value is in fact ontologically subjective, because it is attributed to the landscape 
by a subject through his/her experience of the landscape. As Bluestone (2000, 66) 
puts it: “Buildings, landscapes, and material culture do not have an intrinsic value 
apart from culture”.6
The radical objectivization of the landscape resulting from a focus on its 
intrinsic value only presents the considerable risk of congealing it – in terms of 
both space and time – by dissociating it from the interaction with humans, of 
which it is, however, the phenomenal manifestation. This risk is averted when the 
6
 It should also be noted that all that is involved at this stage is the clarification of the aesthetic state 
of the landscape, as the aesthetic judgement is informed by scientific knowledge. Hence this state is 
not (yet) moral; to be moral it would make sense to formulate reasons that would enable the moral 
evaluation of the landscape, that is the reasons that would prompt people to make it an object of moral 
consideration (Rolston 2002; Hettinger 2008). This is a task which, in this context, is the responsibil-
ity of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics (Brennan and Lo 2015).
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scientific knowledge is considered as a more or less faithful reflection of reality 
rather than a human construct in its regard.
A suggestive illustration of the damaging effects of this kind of conception 
of the relationship between humans and nature can be found in the environmen-
tal thinking of the American philosopher Eugene C. Hargrove. The latter explic-
itly subscribes to the extension of cognitivist aesthetics. However he radicalizes 
it by considering that the scientific categories that accommodate an objective 
aesthetic appreciation of nature ultimately only reflect what happens in the 
actual creative process of non-human nature. He basically says that existence 
precedes essence in non-human nature (Hargrove 1989): nature itself produces 
the criteria of good and beautiful. The consequence of this is that the human 
being can only be something that disturbs this natural beauty – of a resolutely 
wild nature – by inevitably making an essence of its existence. When applied to 
the landscape, this conception returns, ultimately, to the museumization of the 
landscape. Of course, it is no longer a question of congealing it in a representa-
tion (essence) as is the case in the resource-based approach, but of congealing 
it in its unique reality (existence), a reality that humans disturb as soon as they 
try to participate in it.
It appears, therefore, that the non-utility approach to the landscape faces as 
much difficulty in avoiding the outcomes, of which we accused the resource-
based approach, i.e. the museumization or idealization of the landscape. And, just 
as the resource-based approach is confronted with the ‘letting go’ of the land-
scape, when the non-utility approach endeavours to circumvent this problem, 
it must confront the problem of intractable conflicts surrounding the use of the 
landscape. Thus, in all cases, it would appear, to say the least, difficult to ensure 
landscape sustainability within the different proposed theoretical frameworks if 
they are considered independently of each other.
4. Proposal for a circular landscape evaluation process
The linking of the different ideas presented thus far enables us to propose a new 
contribution to the conceptualization of landscape sustainability. As we have seen, 
the resource-based approach demonstrates the use-related values of the landscape 
in the sense that it provides sense of meaning to the actors involved. For its part, 
the non-utility approach primarily concerns the existence values of the landscape 
– in particular aesthetic values – which promote the existence of the landscape as 
a singular entity for an actor. It then identifies the intrinsic value of the landscape, 
expressing the value of the landscape in its singular reality in the judgement of the 
actors concerned. As the development of the non-utility approach showed, these 
three concepts of the value of the landscape – use value, (aesthetic) existence 
value and intrinsic value – complement each other mutually while correcting 
each other’s negative effects. Thus the establishment of landscape sustainability 
involves the deployment of what we propose to call the “circular landscape evalu-
ation process” (cf. Figure 1).
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To ensure the sustainability of a landscape, we can start with the resource-
based approach and the use values that it enables us to identify. The Figure 1 
shows however, as already stated, a consumption-based attitude to the landscape 
that is driven by pleasure tends to reduce the landscape to an idealized repre-
sentation which leads to its museumization or Disneyfication. To avoid such an 
outcome, actors can easily swing to the opposite extreme, i.e. to ‘letting the land-
scape go’, which has the perverse effect of eliminating all possibility of identifica-
tion with and appropriation of the milieu by the actors as it is subject to constant 
change. Both of these consequences of the resource-based approach result in the 
neglect of the individual, unique aspect of a landscape.
Taking this irreplaceable, singular aspect of the landscape into account 
means that the actors must grant an existence value to the landscape which 
is closely linked with their own landscape experience. This enables them to 
experience the singularity of the landscape, particularly through their aesthetic 
appreciation of it. Accordingly, the attribution of this existence value by each of 
the actors makes it possible to counteract the perverse effects of the resource-
based approach. In effect, it is added to the use values which the actors are likely 
to attribute to the landscape. By taking it into account, the actors can avoid a 
landscape being denatured to the point that it is transformed into an entirely 
different landscape.
However, the fact remains that this existence value is variable from one actor 
to another and exposed to the subjectivity of individuals and their always varying 
experiences. As a result, in the face of the different uses made of the landscape by 
Use
value
Intrinsic
value 
Existence
value
Figure 1: The circular process of landscape evaluation. The line of argument used in the politi-
cal debates about the landscape is often reductive in that it refers to one of the landscape val-
ues, that is of giving pleasure. In doing this it focuses the debate implicitly on the use value and 
excludes the other (existence and intrinsic) values.
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the actors, the (aesthetic) existence value has little hope of leading to landscape 
sustainability by itself. This is due to the absence of political and social consen-
sus among the actors on what should continue to exist and, therefore, be con-
served. This is why we attempted to show that by acknowledging that landscape 
has an intrinsic value beyond its use and experience values, it becomes possible 
to move on from a subjective conception of landscape aesthetics. This approach 
is not without risks, however, as the attribution of an intrinsic value to the land-
scape risks congealing it in its singular reality and turning it into an object ‘under 
glass’ which is incompatible with human life and the activities it involves. In the 
extreme case this would ensure the programmed death of the landscape – not as a 
result of the disappearance of the natural environment but due to the elimination 
of all relationships of meaning.
The only way of avoiding this stumbling block is to return to the resource-
based approach. This makes it possible to ensure that the landscape remains a liv-
ing entity which is subject to the constantly updated reappropriation by the actors. 
Hence, the landscape is capable of evolving while remaining singular. We believe 
that this can only arise under the condition that this change takes place within the 
limits that the actors impose on themselves in recognizing that the landscape has 
both an (e.g. aesthetic) existence value and an intrinsic value.
The above-proposed circular model of landscape evaluation clearly aims to 
go beyond the classical, dual approach which sustains the debates on landscape 
conservation. This is often based on an opposition between a resource-based con-
ception and a non-utility vision of the landscape. It reflects an exclusively “either/
or” logic – either the landscape is used or not used – without ever conceiving that 
both options could be legitimate. In contrast, the circular model is integrative 
or holistic in the sense that it equally applies the three categories of value in the 
evaluation of a landscape, thereby enabling them to rectify each other.
Finally, the circular evaluation model requires that the actors agree to impose 
restrictions on their use of the landscape without renouncing its use. Hence it 
offers a means of conceiving how it would be possible to see a landscape as a com-
mons if the actors who live in it and shape it comply with use restrictions arising 
from considerations other than purely utilitarian ones, i.e. aesthetic (Lascoumes 
and Le Bourhis 1998). When political consensus legitimizes the application of a 
circular landscape evaluation process, the use, existence and intrinsic values are 
applied equally; thus it becomes possible to evade the logics of appropriation and 
individual interests which are likely to destroy its reality.
In the next section, we illustrate our proposal for the conception of landscape 
evaluation as a circular process based on the example of the Lavaux UNESCO 
World Heritage Site in Switzerland.
5. The case of the Lavaux UNESCO World Heritage Site
The debates surrounding the strengthening of the protection afforded to the 
Lavaux UNESCO World Heritage Site provide a perfect illustration of the ten-
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sions that can arise between the different ways of understanding the value of the 
landscape.7
A particular feature of Switzerland’s system of direct democracy is that allows 
interest groups and political parties to launch national or cantonal popular referen-
dum initiatives with a view to prompting political debates on social issues that are 
not otherwise dealt with directly in political circles. Such processes led to three 
cantonal referendum initiatives, the three “Sauver Lavaux” (“Save Lavaux”) cam-
paigns of 1977, 2005 and 2014. The last of these initiatives, which aimed to estab-
lish greater protection for the Lavaux vineyards, was ultimately rejected by 68.1% 
of the electorate in 2014 (e.g. La Côte, 18.05.2014). The debate that preceded this 
defeat of the initiative basically involved a confrontation between the supporters 
of increased protection, who were attempting to fight the pressure arising from 
property development and the resulting insidious change in the area, and their 
opponents. The latter feared that increased protection would create obstacles to 
economic and social activity in the region (tourism, viticulture, commercial activ-
ity, agriculture etc.) and a loss of autonomy on the part of its municipalities. Thus 
the situation involved a confrontation between the two above-presented landscape 
approaches, i.e. the resource-based approach, which views the landscape through 
the prism of its use value, and the non-utility approach which sees it as a common 
heritage in terms of its existence and intrinsic values.
The Lavaux region has been a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 2007. 
However, it was granted legal protection as far back as the 1970s, and from 2005 
it was the subject of an article in the new constitution of the canton of Vaud of 
2003. At the time of the referendum, the protected area had a population of around 
14,000 inhabitants and 78% of its total area was zoned as unavailable for devel-
opment. A large proportion of area consisted of vineyards, 2% of public utility 
areas (schools, car parks etc.) and 20% of area zoned for development (Cantonal 
executive council 2014, 5). The instigators of the initiative believed that property 
development represented a threat that would result in irreversible damage to the 
area; they proposed the extension of the protected area to new areas bordering 
the site and the banning of all new development apart from a few rare exceptions.
The supporters of the initiative clearly supported a museum-based approach 
to the landscape. But is this based on an ideal representation of the Lavaux site 
resulting from a discourse on the past and the scenic character of the region? 
Or did the museum-based approach adopted by the instigators of the initiative 
rest on the perception of the site’s singularity? In fact, article 1 of the Act on the 
Conservation of the Lavaux Site of 1979 referred to “conserving the identity and 
characteristics of Lavaux” (art. 1, Law on the protection plan of Lavaux 1979), 
in other words its singularity. Among the instigators of the initiative, the inter-
7
 The empirical material presented in this section is mainly based on an analysis of legal documents 
and journal articles published in the context of three cantonal referendum initiatives aimed at 
protecting the vineyard landscape. It is also the outcome of both authors’ subjective confrontation 
with this landscape as they live in Lavaux site.
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pretation of this objective basically encompassed two elements: the beauty of 
the site and opposition to the pressure of property development (Ulmann 2013, 
2014). The first of these relates to an existence value of an aesthetic nature and 
the second to an intrinsic value, in that the aim of the instigators was to prevent 
all new construction within the boundaries of the area’s towns and villages (art. 4 
para. 3 of the text of the initiative). Thus the aim was more or less to conserve the 
existing buildings and infrastructure as though they only served the purposes of 
contemplation and visiting but not habitation.
Our framework for the analysis of landscape values makes it possible to dem-
onstrate that the supporters of the initiative constructed the debate on the rein-
forcement of the protection of Lavaux by placing two concepts, i.e. the non-utility 
approach with its existence and intrinsic values and the resource-based approach 
with its use values, at the opposite ends of an axis. Rather than consider that the 
(aesthetic) existence value and intrinsic value of the site must be viewed within 
a dynamic in which the use values are of equal legitimacy, they championed a 
conception based on the conservation of the Lavaux landscape that would lead 
to its museumization. In other words, the resource and non-resource approaches 
were envisaged on the basis of a linear opposition processes between the two; 
this perspective is based on a binary logic which directs landscape evaluation in 
the direction of an insoluble conflict between the landscape actors. In this article 
we assert that, on the contrary, a circular process for the evaluation of the Lavaux 
site would have facilitated dialogue between the resource-based and non-utility 
approaches, which would favour the reciprocal correction of the bias that results 
from the translation of the two value systems into practice.
By way of illustration, we will review some of the points of conflict that arose 
in the debates surrounding the different referendums. The argument centred on 
the ‘Disneyfication of the landscape’ (Le Nouvelliste, 28.01.2012) refers to the 
handiwork of the inhabitants and promoters who stage their landscape by creating 
‘tradition’ and the archaic on a modern basis. The most striking example of this 
practice is that of concrete vineyard walls which are covered with cladding that 
is made to look like dressed stone. In this case the resource-based value of the 
landscape is clearly highlighted as these practices are based on the theory that a 
copy (even a badly made one) will have the same effect as the original landscape.
The ‘placing under glass’ comparison was used extensively in the local press 
(e.g. Le Matin, 18.05.2014) to criticize those who would like to protect the land-
scape in its ‘original’ state. This protection strategy aims to prohibit all new 
development activity within the protected area with a view to fighting all pos-
sible change. In this line of argument, the perpetuation of the intrinsic value of 
the landscape is highlighted by the protagonists. Through the conservation mea-
sures they advocate, they enter into conflict with the inhabitants who, through 
an identity-based attachment with their region, prioritize an existence value, the 
identity value of the landscape which is understood as a living space which they 
have appropriated over the course of their own lives and those of their families. 
Accordingly, as they see it, the landscape should remain a living one, in other 
From landscape resources to landscape commons 723
words it should continue to provide a stage for economic production processes 
(O’Neill and Walsh 2000). They fight to avoid ‘overprotection’. Although it is 
based on fundamentally different values, this line of argument is close to and 
interlinked with the argument put forward by the defenders of the landscape’s use.
As evidenced by the successive generations of protection plans from 1979, the 
recourse to three popular initiatives, the need for the cantonal executive council 
to adopt a position in a counter-project to the initiative, the aesthetic existence 
value of the landscape was the subject of numerous political debates. Based on its 
analysis, the success of the counter-project developed by the cantonal executive 
council and accepted by a majority of 68.5% in the referendum of 18 May 2014 is 
specifically due to a circular process of evaluation of the Lavaux area. Moreover, 
it demonstrates the difficulty that exists in arbitrating between different types of 
landscape values. On the one hand, in its memorandum addressing the voters 
(Cantonal executive council 2014, 11), the cantonal executive council admitted 
that the Lavaux site is under threat from the pressure of property development. 
It acknowledged, therefore, that the Lavaux landscape has an intrinsic value and 
that it needs to be conserved. However, according to the council, this protection 
would not be provided by an almost complete ban on construction as a number 
of human activities – starting with viticulture, the activity that had shaped this 
landscape for hundreds of years – had to be given sufficient leeway to develop 
and thereby ensure the endurance of the site. In this sense, the position adopted 
by the cantonal executive council reflected the desire of a large proportion of the 
population for the Lavaux site not to be subject to a logic of private appropriation 
without restrictions. Hence we would suggest that in doing this, it extracted this 
part of the territory from purely mercantile considerations and subsumed it de 
facto under the category of the commons.
Figure 2 visualizes the conflict that distinguished the supporters of the 
initiatives from its opponents in terms of the circular model of landscape eval-
uation, implemented – intentionally or unintentionally – by the cantonal exec-
utive council. The outer circle shows the binary logic underlying the debate 
between the resource-based approach and the non-utilitarian approach to the 
Lavaux site. This differs from the resource-based approach in two ways: first 
by defending the existence values (aesthetic, heritage) of the Lavaux site and, 
second, by referring to an intrinsic value (aesthetic) which is reflected in the 
desire to prohibit any change to the site. The circle itself illustrates how the 
use, existence and intrinsic values attributed to the site correct the excesses 
arising from the dualistic opposition between the resource-based and non-
utilitarian approaches.
The case of the Lavaux UNESCO World Heritage Site illustrates the fact that 
the lively discussion about the preservation of the terrace vineyards actually made 
use of concepts originating in two different theoretical approaches to the land-
scape. We have attempted to demonstrate that the sustainability of the landscape 
is promoted through a concept for its conservation that does not set the resource-
based approach in opposition to the non-utility approach. On the contrary, it 
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strives to make use of both approaches while balancing out the faults of one with 
the advantages of the other in a circular evaluation process.
6. Discussion – landscape as a commons
In this article, we used the concept of commons to broaden the resource-based 
approach to landscapes. We claimed that a landscape commons is a resource 
whose non-utility values have been discovered and acknowledged. The recogni-
tion of the importance of non-utility values of landscape has profound implica-
tions for the analysis of landscape conflicts; it involves a shift in emphasis towards 
three essential processes that arise in contested landscapes:
1. A process of collective appropriation by concerned actors which goes 
beyond exclusive private appropriation strategies. While property titles 
secure individual rights to the use of the resource, commons “empower 
people to be co-proprietarians and co-stewards of their commons” (Bollier 
and Helfrich 2013). This is in-line with the findings of neoinstitutionalist 
scholars studying the commons: the long-term functioning of a common-
pool resource institution (CPRI) implies a sense of collective ownership 
of the resource (Ostrom 1990, 2010). Mattei (2013) goes even further: 
Use value, expressed through
soft tourism activities,
UNESCO regional marketing,
organic wine production 
Intrinsic value,
expressed through
landscape-sensitive
building activity  
Existence value, expressed
through contemplation of scenic
aspect of landscape, perception
of picturesqueness and beauty  
Resource-based approach leading to
‘Disneyfication’ or ‘museumization’ of
landscape, promotion of tourism infrastructure,
regional marketing, wine production
Subjective (non-utility)
approach  leading to
insoluble conflicts due
to lack of collective
appreciation criteria
Non-utility approach
leading to attempts to
ban construction activity
or prohibit pesticide use
Management of
landscape as a
commons
Figure 2: The circular process of landscape evaluation as applied to the case of Lavaux. From 
landscape conflicts based on binary oppositions between competing ways of evaluating land-
scape values (outer circle), a shift toward a circular (holistic) evaluation strategy (inner circle) 
makes it possible to trigger a dialogue between landscape values.
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according to him, commons are resources that belong to the people “as a 
matter of life necessity”. In the Lavaux case study, this view is reflected 
in the law: according to the understanding of the cantonal authorities, the 
Lavaux landscape cannot only be used: because of its intrinsic and exist-
ence values, landowners, wine-growers, other inhabitants and visitors 
all need to make sacrifices for the greater good and future generations. 
However, it is notoriously difficult for the law to grasp the complexity of 
landscapes, which by definition extend beyond individual plots of land 
and administrative boundaries: in most cases, the collective dimension 
of landscape conflicts with the exclusive appropriation of resources that 
materializes in the institution of private property (Gerber and Knoepfel 
2008).
2. A process of political decision-making involving forms of collective or 
participatory management. Recognizing the different values of landscape 
is a first step towards acknowledging the legitimacy of actors who express 
alternative opinions. Actors fight not only to protect their (use) interests, 
but also and more fundamentally to promote their values (Sabatier 1998). 
The commons-based approach transforms the landscape into a political 
issue. “[T]hese commons tend to carry meanings that draw upon earlier 
notions of shared resources and regulatory regimes expressing partici-
patory forms of governance” (Olwig 2003). The landscape becomes an 
issue of democracy among all actors who derive sense from the landscape 
or assign meaning to it. Conversely, negating the collective dimension 
of landscapes is also a political strategy of those who prioritise its use 
value and aim to ensure that their particular interests prevail. While the 
use value of landscapes is put forward by powerful economic interests 
(e.g. the tourism industry), the defence of non-use values is by definition 
economically less profitable – at least in the short run. The initial focus of 
much of the neoinstitutionalist literature on relatively simple CPRI with 
model character (following rational choice approaches) might have led 
to underresearch power issues shaping the political decision-making pro-
cedures on the management of the commons (Theesfeld 2011; Kashwan 
2015). Framing landscape conflicts in terms of value helps uncover power 
games surrounding the definition of the political objectives to follow in 
governing landscape commons.
3. A process of collective identity-building justifying the demands for the 
political recognition of the symbolic, inalienable and irreplaceable nature 
of the landscape. “From a philosophical and epistemological point of 
view, ‘landscape as a common good’ means sharing political and envi-
ronmental values, which are important and determinant for the building 
of the identity of societies” (Menatti 2014, 41). The questioning of the 
different values of the landscape results in an assessment that goes beyond 
managerial considerations about its use or utility value. A commons-based 
approach to landscape can serve to retain a sense of proportion and to 
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balance competing interests; it relates decision-making with larger causes 
and other important issues (Lascoumes and Le Bourhis 1998, 44). The 
issue of cultural identity linked with the management of the commons is 
a topical factor explaining the long-term functioning of CPRI, receiving 
increasing attention from neoinstitutionalist scholars studying CPRI (Cox 
et al. 2014).
Each of these three processes – collective appropriation, collective decision-mak-
ing and collective identity-building – stresses the long-term dimension of land-
scapes when they are appraised as commons. Hence the commons concept echoes 
the current discussions on the links between landscape and sustainability (Sgard 
2010). In line with the UNESCO Florence Declaration on Landscape which “pro-
poses a holistic idea of landscape, that is universal and global and, at the same 
time local, as it entails a respectful approach to the difference and the diversity 
of identity of places”, the commons-based approach to landscape may be the one 
that is best suited to apprehending the social reality of landscape values (Menatti 
2014, 41). The notion of world heritage, as promoted by the UNESCO label, 
stresses the inalienability of the landscape and aims to protect it against disruptive 
uses, such as excessive marketization, in the name of values other than utilitarian 
ones.
7. Conclusion
The resource-based conceptualization of the landscape has the great merit of giv-
ing the landscape political visibility. This approach provides an important tool for 
the promotion of better landscape management. In practice, it often comes down 
to describing landscape conflicts as the product of struggles between opposing 
interests. If it is merely a matter of ‘interests’, why do the actors not manage to 
find a compromise solution given that this would be in their ‘interest’? Taking into 
account that landscape conflicts often end in deadlock leading to the breakdown 
of negotiations, this article aims to go beyond a resource-based approach to the 
landscape and questions the very conceptualization of landscape value.
The primary contribution of this article consists in demonstrating the limits 
and even risks inherent in an exclusively resource-based approach to the land-
scape, which is primarily based on the concept of a use value or utility value 
(Maruani and Amit-Cohen 2013). The same objective is adopted by many stud-
ies that attempt to integrate symbolic, aesthetic or identity values into landscape 
appraisals, thereby demonstrating a practical need to go beyond a use-based 
approach to landscapes (Nohl 2001; Stephenson 2008; Beza 2010; Klein et al. 
2015). The second contribution of this article is that it demonstrates not only that 
the value of the landscape is not limited to its utility dimension, but primarily 
that, far from being a purely theoretical exercise, an understanding of the non-
utility values of the landscape – the existence value and intrinsic value – makes 
it possible to analyse not only the motivations of the actors involved in landscape 
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conflicts better but above all the basis of their arguments. Our third contribution 
resides in presenting the outline of a circular model for establishing a dialogue 
between the three identified values, that is the use, existence and intrinsic values, 
which can provide a better account of the complex process of landscape evalua-
tion. The landscape projects that succeed in practice are those that manage, con-
sciously or unconsciously, to establish a dialogue between the three concepts of 
landscape value.
This leads us to the conclusion that the proposed theoretical framework based 
on a circular evaluation of landscape values can usefully contribute to the concep-
tualization of landscape as a commons. A phenomenological understanding of the 
landscape invites us to move beyond the reductionist opposition between the sub-
ject and the object, which predominantly leads to considerations on landscape’s 
use value. It helps us remember that commons cannot be reduced to resources 
that can be appropriated. Because it can accommodate all three types of values, 
the commons expresses a qualitative relation with nature. A phenomenological 
approach to the landscape stresses that we are part of it. As Mattei (2013, our 
italics) puts it, we should understand “to what extent we are the commons, in as 
much as we are part of an environment, an urban or rural ecosystem. Here, the 
subject is part of the object”. Through its different values, landscape as commons 
is inseparably linked with communities and the individuals who composes them.
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